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The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility is easily one of the best philosophy books I 
have read and it may even be the best. Waller’s writings are erudite, sharp and immensely 
important in a time where individuality and harshness are omnipresent. The book is a must 
read for anyone who is convinced that philosophy is not just about asking critical questions, 
but also about getting at the truth of things that matter. Inflicting (serious) harm on others 
without a proper justification matters whether it concerns perpetrators harming victims or the 
criminal justice system harming offenders and forensic patients. Questioning retributive 
punishment in the face of challenging criticisms is an integral part of the free will skepticism 
position and Waller’s book adds much to this challenging philosophical debate. 
In his excellent book Waller carefully explains that one of the reasons why compatibilist 
thinkers like Daniel Dennett argue that we should hold on to our current practices of 
attributing praise and blame is the worry that “the steady march of scientific understanding 
will erode away all the space required for free will and moral responsibility” (176). We will 
have nothing left. As we understand more and more about individual’s formative histories, we 
will have more and more excuses available to argue away all attributions of competency and 
human agency. We will be left with a system that denies moral responsibility based on the 
recognition of “universal flaws and a universal denial of individual competency.” (179) We 
will undermine personal agency, personal strength and all human achievements thereby 
creating a world of non-competent automatons. Without moral responsibility, philosophers 
fear our emotional lives will be impoverished, morality will be lost, and harsh and 
uncontrollable forms of “therapy” will replace punishment. 
If this would follow from a free will skeptic approach to human behavior and decision-
making it is troublesome indeed. In his book, Waller decisively argues that there is no reason 
to hold these views. Waller strongly rejects what he previously coined the “excuse-
extensionist model”: the idea that the denial of moral responsibility implies or necessitates a 
universal extension of competence-destroying excuses.33 He correctly identifies that the 
denial of moral responsibility entails that no individual is morally responsible in a desert-
based manner no matter how much or little competency that individual possesses. No matter 
how much or little capacity for human agency that individual possesses. The book confronts 
us with the implications of taking moral responsibility skepticism seriously: We can use our 
scientific understanding of human behavior to identify whether or not an individual has the 
capacity for take-charge responsibility, but not (desert-based) moral responsibility. Waller 
describes take-charge responsibility as “the sort of responsibility we can have for a project, a 
role, or enterprise; or to extend it further, the sort of responsibility we can claim for our own 
decision and our own lives” (182). It is about managing one’s own life, making one’s own 
decisions and following one’s own path. Hence, it seems, without freedom one cannot 
exercise take-charge responsibility. 
Although Waller is a fervent denier of moral responsibility, he does present an account of 
freedom / free will. Waller rejects the idea of free will as a uniquely human capacity or power 
that is distinct from the capacities or powers that nonhuman animals possess and explains it in 
a naturalistic sense. I agree that it makes no sense to draw a line between humans and 
nonhuman animals when faced with Waller’s understanding of free will. However, his 
understanding of free will seems different from the way in which free will skeptics, hard 
incompatibilists and libertarians typically understand free will (i.e., contra-causal). In my 
view, there is a difference between free will, as for example discussed by Sam Harris (2012) 
and Caruso (2013, 2016) and freedom, as for example defended by compatibilists such as 
Daniel Dennett (1978, 2003) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998). Free will skeptics argue that the 
relevant question is whether an offender could have acted differently in precisely those 
circumstances with precisely the powers and limitations he or she actually had. Could he or 
she actually have acted differently? Free will in this sense entails being the sole author of 
one’s behavior and implies that one could genuinely have acted otherwise (as also defined by 
Waller in his earlier writings)34 Free will skeptics hold that this is the kind of free will that is 
needed to attribute “moral guilt” and to justify retributive punishment and it is entirely 
different from compatibilist freedom. 
Compatibilist freedom distinguishes between individuals with and without normal capacities 
for moral decision-making and human agency within a deterministic worldview. Such a 
difference is normatively relevant and may be scientifically identifiable. However, if agents 
with and without these capacities are considered inhabitants of a world in which behavior is 
fully determined by antecedent factors, can it ever be justified to purposively inflict harm on 
offenders on the ground that they acted freely? There is a huge difference between feeling 
(appropriately) in charge of one’s actions on the one hand, and having the (contra-causal) 
capacity to make a different choice at a given moment in time if faced with exactly the same 
formative history on the other hand. Whereas compatibilists are willing to use such freedom 
as the basis of moral responsibility attributions, free will skeptics argue that this capacity 
cannot justify desert-based moral responsibility or a concept of legal responsibility and 
punishment drawing upon desert. 
It therefore makes sense to draw a distinction between free will and freedom, or between free 
will and free behavior. Individuals can be free to a greater or lesser extent in the sense of 
having greater or lesser capacities for (moral) agency, reason-responsiveness, rational 
deliberation and behavior, self-control, self-governance, etc. (all interrelated concepts). 
Nonhuman animals can be free to a greater or lesser extent in line with the species-typical 
display and possession of their behavioral capacities. Waller seems to understand free will as 
“not being hampered from performing species-typical behavior,” which is essentially how 
many compatibilist understand free will, or rather, freedom. It tracks Wakefield’s 
understanding of “normality” with respect to psychiatric disorders in humans.35 That kind of 
free will (i.e., freedom) does not undermine the moral responsibility system because it can 
operate from within the moral responsibility system. It is the contra-causal notion or rather, its 
absence, that undermines the moral responsibility system that Waller fiercely rejects. If 
contra-causal free will does not exist, and it does not, then it is fundamentally unfair to hold 
individuals morally responsible and retributively punish wrongdoers even if society cannot or 
should not completely eliminate punishment. Hence, it seems that two very distinct notions of 
free will are doing the conceptual work in Waller’s book: the free will skeptic notion of free 
will that leads to the rejection of (desert-based) moral responsibility and the compatibilist 
notion of freedom that allows for the preservation of take-charge responsibility. If these two 
notions are kept separate, it might make Waller’s line of reasoning even more convincing. 
Freedom exists in gradations and refers to psychological capacities that can be described by 
our existing scientific knowledge. Compatibilist thinkers typically understand freedom as a 
backward-looking notion. Individuals with a normal capacity for moral decision-making and 
behavior are considered free and therefore morally responsible for their behavior. Free will 
skeptics may also attribute some notion of freedom to individuals, but their understanding of 
freedom will be forward-looking. Forward-looking freedom, human agency and take-charge 
responsibility are interrelated concepts within a free will skeptic account. Having or lacking 
human agency and a capacity for take-charge responsibility implies having or lacking the 
freedom to change one’s future behavior if given the means to do so. Whether individuals 
possess or lack normal capacities for human agency and take-charge responsibility is 
therefore important with respect to rehabilitation and leading a crime-free life. These 
capacities are based on cognitive, motivational and emotional processes that can be enhanced 
to a greater or lesser extent if found to be lacking or impaired in a given individual. The latter 
is the goal of moral enhancement, which can be achieved by traditional means such as 
education and moral upbringing or potentially by biomedical means. As individuals, we do 
not have the free will to act differently at a given moment in time, but we do possess the 
freedom or take-charge responsibility to change our future behavior provided adequate means 
to accomplish such changes are provided. Such means can focus on changing the environment 
by addressing structural impediments to leading a crime-free life (e.g., addressing poverty, 
addiction, unemployment, incarceration) or on changing the individual in question (i.e., 
restoring or enhancing an individuals’ decision-making capacities and behavior through 
behavioral and/or neurobiological interventions).36 
If better formative histories allow for a morally better world, we clearly have strong reasons 
to focus on changing our societies and perhaps our genetic and biological make-up for the 
better. However, one could also argue that forward-looking notions of freedom are as 
unintelligible as backward-looking notions of freedom since all behavior is determined. 
Hence, whether or not our society moves towards a morally better world or a less violent 
world, as for example Pinker (2011) has argued, is not up to us. Can we truly make sense of a 
forward-looking notion of freedom if contra-causal free will and desert-based moral 
responsibility are lost? Can you intelligibly preserve forward-looking freedom without 
backward-looking freedom? Perhaps only if we acknowledge that it is just as much an illusion 
as backward-looking notions. 
Waller wants us to discard our existing “moral responsibility system” and urges us to look for 
a better and more productive system. I agree with Waller. One thing that might be important 
to highlight is the need to be very cautious when considering the idea that prevention and/or 
rehabilitation measures are “better” than (retributive) punishment, especially with respect to 
forensic mental health treatment. The risk of undesirable ethical, social and legal 
consequences such as the deliberate misuse of treatment programs for social control purposes 
needs to be taken seriously.37 Individuals receiving a psychiatric label run the risk of being 
stigmatized, may experience fear of rejection and mistreatment, and may be subject to 
discrimination and prejudice. Experiences like these make individuals prone to the 
development of low self-esteem and the internalization of self-blame which may prevent 
successful treatment outcomes in the long run. Moreover, the risk of false positives inherent 
to medical diagnoses in general and psychiatric diagnoses in particular urges us to be very 
careful when focusing on (early) detection, prevention and rehabilitation.38 We should be 
mindful that certain behaviors are easily misclassified as behavioral indications of an 
underlying disorder while in reality being expressions of normal variation in personality traits 
and behaviors. The risk of false positives is especially worrisome when faced with children 
and adolescents living in low socioeconomic, deprived neighborhoods and attending schools 
with high-delinquency rates. Behavior that reflects normal survival and coping strategies in 
such environments may be misunderstood as exemplifying underlying disorders. 
For Waller, denying moral responsibility is about recognizing that our desire for retribution is 
a guide to unjust behavior. In his view, the entire system of moral responsibility is flawed and 
in violation of basic principles of fairness. If we recognize this, then we can pave the road 
towards a better society. While blame and retributive punishment are lost, moral evaluation 
and the identification of wrong behavior as morally bad behavior remains available to us. 
From a broader societal and criminal justice perspective, the extent to which humans display 
take-charge responsibility and how this can give rise to morally good rather than morally bad 
behavior, is crucial. Forward-looking freedom implies that human behavior is malleable and 
that continuous efforts to achieve more morally good behavior are worthwhile. 
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